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The Role of Renewable Portfolio
Standards in the Context of a National
Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program
by Neal J. Cabral*
Introduction

Reasons for Enacting an RPS

As the Senate prepares to take up a measure, passed by
the House of Representatives, for a national renewable energy
portfolio standard (“RPS”),1 and continues serious deliberations
about a mandatory greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reduction program, it is an appropriate time to examine what role a national
RPS would have within a mandatory GHG reduction program.
Because Congress seems to prefer a broad cap-and-trade program as the best least-cost vehicle with which to implement a
mandatory carbon reduction program, tension exists between
a market-oriented cap-and-trade program and a command and
control RPS mandate. This debate does not take place within a
vacuum, as almost half the states have adopted an RPS or similar
renewable energy targets.2 A national RPS calls into question the
role such state RPS programs would have both within a national
RPS and within the context of
a national carbon cap-and-trade
program.
Three primary bases for tension exist between an RPS and
a cap-and-trade program. First,
renewables, as imposed through
an RPS, are typically not the
least-cost compliant solution
to carbon reductions, particularly in the earlier stages of any
carbon cap-and-trade program
where the required reductions are expected to be relatively modest. Second, once a carbon cap-and-trade program is enacted, the
purpose of an RPS program becomes more uncertain because
renewable power purchased pursuant to an RPS program will
no longer provide any additional carbon reductions beyond
those required by the cap. Third, it is difficult to integrate RPS
requirements into a carbon cap-and-trade program in a way that
produces relatively fair results with respect to the entities that
purchase the renewables and, therefore, bear their costs.
Taken together, these three tensions between an RPS program and a least-cost carbon cap-and-trade policy tend to weaken
the current standard rationales for enacting RPS programs. In
order to properly sort out these issues and develop a coordinated
and sound national carbon policy that includes a renewables
component, legislators must evaluate and agree on the specific
purposes for enacting an RPS program in the context of an
expected carbon cap-and-trade program. They must also structure both programs to meet the defined objectives of the RPS.

An RPS requires that electric generators or suppliers source
a defined percentage of their power from renewable energy
facilities.3 Qualifying renewables vary by program, but typically include wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, landfill gas, and
sometimes hydropower.4 Although renewable energy is a term
intended to describe energy sources that are considered renewable because they are powered by energy coming from an inexhaustible source, or from sources that regenerate fast enough
that they will not be depleted, RPS can also include sources that
do not fit that description. However, all qualifying RPS sources
currently under the various state standards and proposed federal
standard are also at least low-carbon or carbon-neutral sources
of power, and it is this defining attribute that, from a policy perspective, is probably the most important aspect of renewables.
That RPS mandates are primarily carbon reduction mandates seems relatively clear.
Although RPS requirements are
almost never enacted primarily as specific carbon reduction programs, probably due to
political concerns, this seems to
be their primary perceived benefit. In other words, while states
and Congress apparently count
RPS programs as an important
contributor to GHG reductions, they rarely discuss any specific
carbon-based programmatic aspects of an RPS, such as explaining how the RPS would fit within specifically adopted carbon
reduction goals.
Instead, proponents often tout renewables as a sound policy measure because, in addition to being green from a general emissions perspective, they also provide other ancillary
benefits. For example, renewables are said broadly to promote
energy security. While renewables do promote certain aspects
of energy security through supply diversity, they do not tend
to reduce fuel imports since the power sector generally imports
only a very small amount of fuel from outside North America.
Studies on whether renewables contribute importantly to energy

That RPS mandates
are primarily carbon
reduction mandates seems
relatively clear.
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price stability also conflict. 5 In general, the International Energy
Agency has concluded that while “environmental objectives will
be uppermost,” RPS can provide some energy security enhancements.6
However, these ancillary reasons for promoting an RPS do
not appear themselves to be sufficiently compelling to support
national RPS legislation. Instead, the carbon reduction element
of RPS requirements appears to be the driving force. That conclusion seems obvious when one considers whether states would
ever adopt RPS programs if qualifying emission sources met all
of the non-carbon benefits that RPS advocates purport renewables provide, but were in fact carbon-based sources of power.
In such a case, little advocacy for RPS programs would exist
at all, and few would be adopted. We can see this quite readily
when we consider coal-to-liquids plants. In fact, such plants
do rather efficiently reduce dependence on foreign energy
supplies such as oil for mobile sources, diversify domestic
energy facilities, and promote new technological developments,
but they hardly receive support, and are instead typically
opposed, because the process is very carbon-intensive.
If the policy support for an RPS primarily tends to be based
on the carbon reduction component, it makes sense from a policy
perspective to evaluate the efficacy and role of an RPS requirement within a larger national carbon reduction strategy. Based
on congressional deliberations to date and proposed legislation,7
it seems clear that Congress’ current preference to address carbon nationally is through a broad cap-and-trade program. Hence,
an evaluation of the efficacy and role of an RPS program should
include an evaluation of how an RPS fits within a national GHG
cap-and-trade program.

Instead, the regulated community is free to determine what steps
should be taken to meet the overall cap. Consequently, then, it
can develop and pursue the least-cost solutions.
The sulfur dioxide emissions trading approach established
under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments9 produced vast
compliance cost savings primarily because the U.S. power
industry figured out how to burn low-sulfur coal in units not
designed for such coal, and thereby avoided the costs associated
with the assumed need to widely employ more expensive scrubbing control technology.10 In other words, the market figured
out a method of compliance that was not anticipated when the
requirements were adopted. This method likely would have been
unavailable had a command-and control-mandate based on the
performance of scrubber technology been adopted.
Notably, the least-cost result expected under a cap-and-trade
program is not an end in itself, but rather allows policy makers to
set more ambitious and more certain emissions reduction targets
than they might otherwise be able to obtain. EPA observed:
[T]he cost-minimizing feature of cap and trade has
long-term environmental benefits. Driving down the
cost of reducing a unit of pollution means that policymakers and regulating authorities can set targets that
reduce more pollution at the same cost to society. This
system makes it economically and politically feasible
to achieve greater environmental improvement.11
Given Congress’ concern about the overall impact of any
national carbon reduction strategy on the health of the U.S.
economy, the costs of any specific carbon reduction program
become an important political question.

RPS Under a Cap-and-Trade Program

A national RPS program, as a command and control mandate, could conflict with a market-based cap-and-trade program.
That conflict is primarily relevant if a known cost discrepancy
actually exists between renewables as a carbon compliance
option and other available methods of carbon reduction. The conflict emerges clearly in the case of an RPS because renewables
in fact cost more in the aggregate than other carbon reduction
options that might be employed, at least until the cap tightens
over time.
The relative cost-effectiveness of a national RPS as a carbon reduction strategy has been evaluated a number of times.
Most notably, the 2002 Parer Report to the Council of Australian Governments on national energy reform concluded that
Australia’s national RPS program should be abolished and
replaced with a national cap-and-trade policy for carbon because
the RPS proved a cost-ineffective method of obtaining carbon
reductions when compared with a cap-and-trade program.12 Subsequent analyses of the Australian RPS program concluded that:
(1) the dollar per ton cost of carbon reductions associated with a
ten percent RPS standard would support four times the amount
of carbon reductions if imposed instead as a carbon reduction
requirement under a cap-and-trade program; and (2) an amount
of carbon reductions equivalent to what a ten percent RPS standard would obtain could be achieved through a cap-and-trade
program at a third of the price.13

Because RPS programs seem largely intended to reduce
carbon emissions, despite the fact that they do not actually target carbon emissions, but rather fuel choice, their approach is
a potentially inefficient command-and-control mandate at odds
with a market-based cap-and-trade program. Market-based capand-trade programs hold, as their fundamental premise, that
allowing the regulated community to determine its own solutions
to meet a mandatory emissions cap is far more cost-effective and
more certain than a one-size fits all series of command-and-control mandates, which instead set specific performance or technology standards.8 As a consequence, cap-and-trade programs
are expected to provide least-cost solutions to emission reduction goals.

Benefits of a Cap-and-Trade Program
Cap-and-trade programs have two fundamental benefits as
compared with command-and-control emission reduction programs. First, by allowing trading, the program does not decide
who has to make reductions. This allows sources to take emissions reduction steps when the costs are favorable to the source
and to forgo that option and instead purchase emissions allowances or credits when the costs are unfavorable to a source.
Second, a cap-and-trade program does not decide what those
reductions must be or how the source achieves the reduction.
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Effects of an RPS Conflict with Cap-and-Trade
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Similar studies have been performed for a U.S. national
RPS, and the conclusions are the same. One unpublished study
concludes that the carbon reductions associated with an RPS
that rises to ten percent cost more than four times as much as
would be the case if a cap-and-trade program were placed on the
power generation sector.14 Another study concluded that an RPS
is “less cost-effective as a mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from electricity generators than a policy designed specifically to limit carbon emissions.”15
As these cost studies make clear, a carbon-cap-and-trade
program is generally insufficient to sustain widespread penetration of renewables at higher RPS levels simply as a result of
power price increases resulting from the cap. If that were true,
then renewables would be the compliance option of choice in
the economic modeling described above. Instead, it is generally
energy efficiency and conservation measures, which often have
a positive payback over time and thus cost nothing, that tend to
replace renewables as a more cost-effective compliance option.
However, some renewable projects remain cost-effective, and
are undertaken even under a cap-and-trade program, where
the cost of carbon raises power prices. All of these results can
change when the stringency of the cap is increased, or if the capand-trade program provides specific incentives to renewables
through a favorable allowance
allocation.
In sum, an RPS appears to
be, at bottom, largely intended
as a carbon reduction policy and
should be explicitly treated as
such, including open discussion
of how it fits into any national
carbon policy, such as a capand-trade program; and an RPS
mandate is a more expensive and less-cost effective method of
carbon reduction than simply adopting a cap-and-trade program
with no such command and control mandates. Because Congress
has expressed great concern over the cost and broad economic
impact of a mandatory carbon program, and intends to seek least
cost solutions where available, the higher cost of an RPS versus alternatives to produce equivalent carbon reductions would
seem to argue for a careful assessment of the specific goals and
benefits of an RPS program in light of an expected mandatory
carbon cap-and-trade requirement.
In addition, maintaining an RPS as a requirement independent of a cap-and-trade program does not provide more or additional carbon reductions. This is due to the fact that the carbon
reductions from the RPS program are simply factored into the
reductions needed to meet the cap, and therefore become a part
of the compliance portfolio. As carbon reductions from renewables occur, alternative reductions that would otherwise have
occurred to meet the cap are forgone. In general, most renewable energy produces carbon reductions because a power generator somewhere reduces its level of fossil fuel consumption,
often natural gas, in an amount equal to the amount of renewable
power that is added to the grid. The fossil fuel power genera-

tor that reduces its output is now left with allowances to sell or
use itself under the cap. This results in an increase in carbon
emissions somewhere that equals the carbon reductions caused,
and emission allowances “freed up,” by the use of renewable
power. Thus, overall emissions remain equal to the level permitted under the cap.

Impacts of an RPS Under a Cap-and-Trade Program
While RPS requirements do not provide additional reductions under a cap-and-trade program, they do define renewable
power as a specific method of obtaining part of the reductions
that will be achieved under the cap. This is true because a certain percentage of renewable power must be purchased under the
RPS without regard for the cap. Additionally, the cost-ineffectiveness of an RPS is confined to, and incurred by, entities that
must comply with the RPS mandate, and this occurs outside the
cap. Thus, the cost of compliance within the cap itself is lowered, although the overall cost to meet the cap is higher when
factoring in RPS costs.
In this light, RPS programs lose much of their stated policy support because, upon implementation of a cap, they are
no longer a carbon reduction policy. Instead, an RPS becomes
a mandate that a certain amount of reductions to be achieved
under a carbon cap must come
from renewable power. Thus,
the question for policy makers
to debate is whether renewables,
despite their cost, are sufficiently
important to an overall national
carbon reduction strategy so
that they should be mandated
as a carbon compliance mechanism? Despite the importance of
these issues, virtually no serious
debate about them has taken place in the United States. Instead,
the benefits of renewables as part of national carbon policy are
largely assumed, and their drawbacks ignored.

RPS obligations often
fall on the company that
distributes power.
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Policy Considerations supporting an RPS
While good public policy requires a careful assessment of
both the benefits and drawbacks of an RPS within the context
of an expected national carbon reduction mandate, the Australian experience tells us this consideration is also important as a
practical matter. After the issuance of the Parer Report, recommending that that the Australian RPS be abolished and replaced
with a more cost-effective cap-and-trade program, investment
in renewables slowed due to the obvious regulatory uncertainty.
That uncertainty remained unresolved for another two years as
Australia reviewed the issues and decided to recommit to the
RPS, albeit with some adjustments. Therefore, in order to provide long term certainty in renewables markets, the fact that an
RPS requirement is not a least-cost solution to carbon reduction and does not provide any additional reductions beyond what
a cap would require should be recognized and accepted after
debate, so as not to cause surprises and associated uncertainty
later.
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Notably, the Australian evaluation of whether to continue
with an RPS or replace it with a carbon cap-and-trade program
provides some insight into specific policies that would support
continuation of the renewables mandate. The primary reasons
articulated for continuing the RPS in Australia were based on the
expectations that renewables would become a more cost-effective carbon reduction option as the cap tightened over time and
as the costs of renewables decreased through continued buildout, and, perhaps more importantly, that renewables presented
an attractive hedge against future technology or other failure for
other carbon reduction measures.16 Similarly, the United States
could also conclude that renewables do promote greater future
compliance certainty and provide an expectation of lower relative costs over time, and that those are sufficient reasons to support continued investment in renewables now so as to preserve
these future benefits.
These benefits, rarely articulated forcefully in the limited
U.S. debate over the role of renewables in a carbon cap-andtrade program, do provide powerful policy arguments to support
continuation of renewables programs. In essence, the primary
attraction of renewables is that the technology is well understood, is fairly readily deployed, and can provide relatively large
reductions, or avoided emissions, on a project basis. Indeed, it
is these aspects of renewables that may make them attractive to
industry. Despite the cost issue, industry has not yet objected to
renewable mandates on any broad or sustained basis as a costineffective method of carbon reduction, however industry has
frequently raised other objections. This may simply reflect the
fact that while the attributes of familiarity and certainty provide tangible benefits, they are not recognized in economic cost
models. Further, as one compares a suite of specific and discrete
renewables projects with a suite of ubiquitous energy efficiency
projects that must be undertaken by third parties, namely power
company customers, ease of implementation for renewables
may prove to be an important factor in tacit acceptance of RPS
programs.
Another benefit of an explicit legislative assessment of
whether to promote higher-cost renewables requirements when
a national carbon trading program is expected to follow is that
specific policy reasons to adopt the higher cost alternative can be
articulated, and the RPS program tailored to promote the identified objectives. For example, if one of the reasons advanced
for an RPS is to make the United States a technology leader
in renewables, then Congress should evaluate whether renewables research and development programs would help promote
that objective. Similarly, if one of the articulated reasons for
employing an RPS mandate is to help the renewables industry
achieve critical economies of scale and so reduce the cost of
renewables, then the RPS should be sized to specifically promote that objective, and no more.
Perhaps most importantly, if an RPS is to be adopted, legislation should provide a comprehensive package that also
removes obstacles to broad renewables penetration and ensures
the renewables target can be met. It is no secret that renewables,
as intermittent sources often concentrated in specific geographic
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regions of the country favorable to the type of generation at
issue, require important and large-scale changes to the existing
transmission and distribution grids in order to achieve significant levels of penetration. The Electric Power Research Institute recently published a paper that specifies precisely what sorts
of large-scale grid and other technology improvements would
be necessary to accommodate significant penetration of renewables.17 It is well known that grid improvements are difficult to
make, take years to permit, and often are not favored investments by power companies. In addition, newer and better power
storage technologies will be needed to accommodate large-scale
renewables penetration.18 Hence, legislative packages seeking to
address the research, permitting and financing issues associated
with such improvements would seem to be a critical aspect of
any sensible and realistic RPS objectives.

Promoting Renewables Under a
Cap and Trade Program
If it is decided as a policy matter that renewables should
be promoted as part of a national cap and trade program, there
are a variety of ways to do this. This Article has focused on an
RPS because Congress is currently considering such a mandate,
although other options to promote defined renewables goals are
also available. An RPS program does have the benefit of providing certainty that a minimum amount of renewable power will
be produced. However, that approach does limit the extent of
renewables penetration to the amount of the RPS, at least until the
time that renewables become competitive as a power source due
to a rise in power prices as a result of a tightening carbon cap.
However, a certain inequity exists associated with RPS
mandates, in that there is often a disconnect between the renewable purchases and the actual carbon reduction, or carbon avoidance. The power company purchasing the renewable power to
meet RPS requirements has paid for the carbon reduction in the
form of the cost difference between otherwise available fossil
power and the renewable power. However, that company often
cannot use the carbon reduction associated with the renewable
power purchase for compliance under a carbon cap because the
power plant that reduces its load to accommodate the renewable power is often a different company than the renewable
power purchaser. Instead, it is either the power generator, which
reduces its load that obtains the carbon benefit even though it did
not pay for the carbon reduction, or the entire carbon market in
general, which obtains a benefit because of lowered demand for
allowances and greater availability of lower cost carbon reductions, which are not used in lieu of higher cost renewable power
reductions (i.e., some of the costs of compliance with the cap are
transferred to the RPS program).19
The reason for this inequity is twofold. First, RPS obligations often fall on the company that distributes power, and that
company may not own any generating facilities. Second, and
more importantly, RPS mandates can typically be met by purchasing renewable energy credits. Use of such credits allows
renewable power sources to situate geographically at the leastcost sites for the power produced, and renewable power purchasers, located far away from renewable resources, to readily and
16

cost-effectively buy renewable power. The consequence of this
is that companies obligated to comply with RPS requirements
can suffer a double hit, in the form of mandatory purchases of
often higher cost renewable power and the general inability to
take carbon credit for those purchases under a carbon cap. If
Congress elects to pass an RPS and/or to allow states to maintain
RPS requirements after implementation of a carbon cap-andtrade program, careful thought need be given to identifying and
accommodating, as best as possible, the impacts an RPS could
have on cap equities.
Instead of an RPS, renewable incentives could be added
in the cap-and-trade program itself by allocating allowances to
renewable plants through a renewables set-aside, by allocating
allowances to the power sector based on power output and not
emissions, or by directing a portion of revenues from any allowance auction to renewables. Each of these mechanisms has individual benefits and complications.
The allowance approach has some appeal in that it provides
some cost limits on what renewable power will be sold, thus
renewable power is transformed from a power purchase obligation under an RPS to subsidized power that will be bought if
the subsidized price is competitive. However, this approach also
does not guarantee that a specific amount of renewable power
will be produced or that the renewable policy objectives will be
met. Other possibilities abound. For example, in some European
countries, renewables are promoted outside of the carbon cap by
feed-in tariffs or other mechanisms providing price supports.20
These price supports begin to decline over time to reflect the
expectation that renewable costs should decrease as market pen-

etration increases. Whatever solution is decided upon, experience has shown that renewable investment is very sensitive to
regulatory uncertainty, and thus, care must be taken to ensure
that regulatory support for renewables is not attenuated by the
form of the mechanism selected to support it.
It is also important to consider the role and impact of existing state RPS standards, which present their own complexities
and may have less well-defined roles once a carbon cap is put in
place. Thorough discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, it should be noted that state RPS programs
may also warrant reevaluation and refocus once a national carbon cap is adopted because these programs also will not produce
any carbon reductions beyond the level of the national cap.

Conclusion
It seems premature for Congress to pass a national RPS
in the face of an expected least-cost national carbon cap-andtrade program without first evaluating the costs and benefits of
renewables, and assessing what role renewables should play in
a national carbon strategy. Renewables are expected to play an
important role in any national carbon strategy, and good policy
reasons exist to support that conclusion. However, the debate
over that issue should be open and clear, and should fully recognize the costs and other issues associated with reliance on renewables as a carbon compliance mandate, to ensure that specific
policy objectives for renewables can be identified and agreed
upon, legislation adopted to address those goals, and renewables
markets provided with certainty.
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